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The production of expectations or future-goals for the development of techniques
which “read” and modulate brain function, represent an important practical tool for
neuroscientists. These visions-of-the-future assist scientists by providing focus for both
individual and cross-disciplinary research programs; they encourage the development of
new industrial sectors, are used to justify the allocation of government resources and
funding, and via the media can help capture the imagination and support of the public.
However, such expectations need to be tempered by reality. Over-hyping brain imaging
and modulation will lead to disappointment; disappointment that in turn can undermine its
potential. Similarly, if neuroscientists focus their attention narrowly on the science without
concomitant consideration of its future ethical, legal and social implications, then their
expectations may remain unrealized. To develop these arguments herein we introduce
the theoretical concept of expectations and the practical consequences of expectations.
We contextualize these reflections by referring to brain imaging and modulation
studies on deception, which encompass the measurement-suppression-augmentation
range.
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INTRODUCING EXPECTATIONS
On May 25th in 1961 during a special address to Congress, a
young and charismatic US President J.F. Kennedy presented an
incredibly exciting prospect to Congress and the entire nation:
a manned moon landing. He was asking Congress to share
his vision, and in so doing to invest an astronomical budget
in research and development to increase the likelihood of that
vision becoming reality. Less than a decade later that vision was
achieved with the Apollo 11 mission and the first moon walk:
“one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind” (Neil
Armstrong, 1969). Kennedy was perfectly aware that the required
technology was not yet available in 1961 but he was well informed
about its potential and knew a thing or two about the power of
expectations.
Proclaiming the start of the Decade of the Brain on 1st
January 1990, President Bush senior stated “The coopera-
tion between [. . .] agencies and the multidisciplinary efforts
of thousands of scientists and health care professionals pro-
vide powerful evidence of our nation’s determination to con-
quer brain disease”. He raised public awareness and brought
to the fore a series of targets (e.g., stopping or curing
Alzheimer’s disease), which have not been quite met yet but
the attention and investments brought upon relevant neu-
roscientific research see us at a clear advantage compared
to our colleagues trying to meet the same targets 25 years
ago.
When discussing scientific and technological advancement the
concept of expectations adopts the shape of; goals, promises,
visions of a future reality, “wishful enactments of desired futures”
(Tutton, 2011, p. 413), and “real-time representations of future
technological situations and capabilities” (Borup et al., 2006,
p. 286). The value of such expectations, as a powerful pre-
cursor to future scientific and technological advances, can-
not be underestimated as both a conceptual and a practical
tool.
In this paper we begin by setting out the benefits to neu-
roscientists of employing expectations. This positive message is
then balanced by a discussion of hype and its potential negative
connotations for research programs. We finish by positing that if
neuroscientists temper their expectations of future scientific and
technological advances with social, ethical, and legal concerns,
they will be better placed to avoid the drawbacks associated
with hype while maintaining their ability to enjoy the benefits
expectations can bring.
EXPECTATIONS: CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL BENEFITS
On a conceptual level, expectations (as described above) represent
the potential pre-manifestation or genesis of a future scientific or
technical advance which has yet to be attained. To illustrate; neu-
roscientists envision a future whereby neuroimaging and brain
stimulation techniques have been developed which, say, detect
deception and/or increase the disposition and the ability to lie
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and deceive (Karim et al., 2010; Mameli et al., 2010; Karton
and Bachmann, 2011), “simply and safely influenc[e] the human
will and freedom by interfering with deception” (Priori et al.,
2008, p. 455; see also the “deception inhibitor”: Bohning et al.,
2004). They may also envision military applications whereby
the ability of human operators to sense and assess threats in
the real world is enhanced by noninvasive brain stimulation
(e.g., Parasuraman and Galster, 2013). These particular near-to-
medium term expectations are typically based on converging evi-
dence from a small series of original precursor studies on human
participants conducted in one or more laboratories around the
world. When neuroscientists envision a future whereby in-helmet
ultrasound transducers could be used to remotely control brain
activity (Tyler, 2010; Sato et al., 2014), or where a time-slowing
pill may be used in law enforcement and prisoner incarceration
(Heaven, 2012; Anderson, 2014), or “brain prostheses” can be
used by the military to enhance memory for complex environ-
ments or existing memories can be wiped out from the brain
of personnel under capture (Moreno, 2012) they are envisioning
medium-to-long term expectations. Here the know-how needed
to achieve these particular goals remains largely unavailable and
it is claimed that the ethical and legal implications of such
enterprise are still relatively imponderable (Attiah and Farah,
2014).
What makes these particular expectations of specific interest
to neuroscientists is that through a combination of their training,
expertise, accumulated knowledge, and access to funding and
specific equipment, neuroscientists find themselves well placed
to successfully act and bring these expectations and visions into
reality. This is not to claim that they are the only scientists
capable of fulfilling these expectations; merely that they may
enjoy a head start on their competitors when attempting to do
so.
Moving beyond the conceptual, it is via its practical benefits
that the true power of expectations becomes recognizable; for
expectations possess the power to assist turning future-visions
into tangible advancements. With similarities to the concept of
the self-fulfilling prophecy (see Merton, 1948), future expecta-
tions have been described as possessing performative or gen-
erative powers (Borup et al., 2006) in that they are “crucial
to providing the dynamism and momentum upon which so
many ventures in science and technology depend” (Brown and
Michael, 2003, p. 3). By studying past advancements, it has been
recognized that expectations can provide the following benefits
(see: van Lente, 1993; Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003; Borup et al.,
2006; Konrad, 2006; Pollock and Williams, 2010; Bakker et al.,
2012):
• A focal point to guide and drive research activities, as well
as a common vision/bridge with which to enhance inter-
disciplinary interactions and communication.
• A promise of future benefits with which to justify and legitimize
the mobilization and allocation of financial resources and other
forms of support.
• The means of attracting the attention and engagement of
diverse actors and potential collaborators; from scientists to
investors, governments, NGOs and policy actors.
• They enable the production of experiments, models, research
projects, and calculations.
• The construction of future scenarios for shaping a technol-
ogy, as well as the formation of a consensus or structure to
counterbalance the inherent uncertainty over the potential of a
new technology which is highest during the early development
stages.
• A means of enlisting public support through the presentation
of possible future(s).
Within the life sciences expectations of future medical
advancements have repeatedly been employed by specific research
areas seeking to benefit from the points listed above. These
expectations have included; the promise of lives being saved and
the development of new cures for diseases as the result of human
embryonic stem cell research (Rubin, 2008); the development of
anti-aging treatments which will extend human lives (Mykytyn,
2010); and the expectation that by identifying one’s genetic
makeup, pharmacogenetics will deliver bespoke, personalized
medications (Limdi and Veenstra, 2010).
Within neuroscience, and in particular the study of neu-
roimaging and brain stimulation, we can readily identify how
neuroscientists are employing expectations in their efforts to
secure supporters and resources for research, attract collabora-
tors and potential customers for spin-off businesses, and pro-
vide focal points with which to guide research. All of this is
achieved through the presentation of possible futures where
brain imaging and modulation advances have been successfully
developed. What follows is a brief description of some of these
research programs, accompanied by the envisioned advances (the
expectations) they are predicted to produce. While presenting
these, we will intentionally embrace such expectations (whether
or not we believe they are realistic), as this will help making
the points we are raising in the following sections even more
obvious.
EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF BRAIN IMAGING
AND MODULATION: THE CASE OF DECEPTION
Riding a wave of exciting technical developments in neuroimag-
ing, one popular research enterprise that has provided fertile
ground for boosting expectations on a global scale is the study
of deception. Here deception is defined as the concealment of
the truth, which often takes the form of a memory, in order to
mislead. On average humans are thought to be badly equipped
to detect deception when the person attempting to deceive is
unfamiliar to the observer (Bond and DePaulo, 2006). Expecta-
tions in this area have included a promise of a future whereby
the scientific detection of deceptive claims and behaviors would
add a game-changing weapon to the arsenal of forensic sci-
ences, police, the judiciary, and military and security agencies
worldwide. Whether that can be ever achieved is still open to
speculation.
Historically a multitude of deception detection systems have
been invented and employed by public and private bodies with
variable success. Few such systems survived in the present; and
none has been scientifically proven to solve the deception detec-
tion problem in the real world. The most popular system so far
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has arguably been the polygraph, however, on close inspection,
it was deemed unreliable; though since its myth is very hard to
debunk, it still has use as a deterrent (NRC (National Research
Council), 2003; see also Moreno, 2012). More recently, advances
in functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and neural
decoding techniques prompted expectations that mind-reading
(or more accurately brain-reading; Gazzaniga, 2005) may soon
become reality (Haynes and Rees, 2006). In relation to decep-
tion, expectations and research have focused on systems that
can accurately detect deceit from brain activation contrasts or
pattern analysis, perhaps in connection with other physiological
measures (Kozel et al., 2009; Langleben and Moriarty, 2013).
These would help reduce uncertainty and provide information
otherwise undetectable to the interviewer. By making the inter-
viewee’s brain more accessible they would artificially augment the
interviewer’s detection capabilities. Moreover, they would provide
essential information about the localization of deception-relevant
brain activity for individually targeted deception modulation
tools (see e.g., Bohning et al., 2004). It may be easy to create
expectations about potential advantages for the criminal justice
system and security at large if such an enterprise were to actually
succeed. For example, it could be claimed that it will be possible
to accurately discriminate between genuine and concocted eye-
witness testimony (Azar, 2011), more judiciary decisions could
be based on objective evidence, and trials would become more
expedite. Culprits would be less likely to elude unmasking and
arguably more likely to be found guilty; crime rates may drop;
and organized crime which relies on member loyalty could be
more penetrated.1 On its face, and without critical analysis, the
benefits cited here might be presented as both obvious and great
in number.
Expectations within deception research are by no means lim-
ited to the development of reliable lie detectors. Indeed nonin-
vasive brain stimulation (e.g., tDCS and TMS) may soon offer
both a new, upgraded alternative to truth serums by enabling
the user to interfere with activity in brain regions that are
causally related with deception (e.g., Priori et al., 2008; Karton
and Bachmann, 2011), as well as its counterpart; a portable
deceit enhancer (Karim et al., 2010; Mameli et al., 2010; Kar-
ton and Bachmann, 2011; Fecteau et al., 2013). It is easy to
imagine the enormous advantages for counterespionage, polic-
ing, and diplomacy if a “deception inhibitor” was available. In
extreme scenarios, interrogations would become more humane;
negating the need for more outrageous practices such as sleep-
deprivation, electric shocks, nail pulling, water-boarding, and
so forth, to weaken psychophysical defense mechanisms and
coerce the disclosure of information (see e.g., Tarabay, 2014,
and the documentary Standard Operating Procedure, 2008). In
more ordinary cases, this induced cooperation would make crim-
inal justice mechanisms more agile and cost-effective. Poten-
tially more guilty individuals will confess and be rightfully
convicted.
Similarly, it is arguable that difficult diplomatic negotiations
could benefit from both sides employing “deception inhibitors”.
These may decrease the capability of either side negotiating
1See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/organizedcrime
FIGURE 1 | The Gartner Hype Cycle (van Lente et al., 2013).
in bad-faith by concealing their true thoughts (though it
is equally likely such devices may make parties reluctant to
enter into negotiations to begin with). Conversely “deception
boosters” would conceivably be invaluable in the hands of private
and governmental agencies concerned with security, policing,
espionage, and diplomacy. Undercover agents might be better able
to conceal their true identities, and negotiators better equipped
to convincingly promote positions they knew to be false.
HYPE: THE DOWNSIDE OF EXPECTATIONS
While expectations such as these play important roles in achieving
scientific and technological advancements, we must acknowledge
an inherent fundamental limitation: expectations may be unreli-
able as predictors of the future (Brown and Michael, 2003). Even
when high expectations for future advancements are shared by
a large multidisciplinary community of scientists enjoying both
support and resources, this does not guarantee scientific success
(Pollock and Williams, 2010; Tutton, 2011). The failure of a
scientific or engineering endeavor to meet its expectations leads to
accusations of hype. Used in this way hype is referring to unrealis-
tic, unattainable expectations; hence it is often only a distinction
in framing that separates expectations from hype. What follows
the characterization of (positive) expectations as (negative) hype
is usually a period of disappointment or disillusionment. Enthusi-
asm for the proposed scientific advancement plummets as a result
of expectation not being met, possibly followed by a gradual form
of recovery. This process is referred to as a hype-disappointment
cycle (van Lente et al., 2013). The Gartner hype cycle (see
Figure 1), employed by the analyst firm Gartner Inc. is probably
the most recognized model employing this concept. Note that
under this model, the failure of scientific research or technological
development to meet its initial expectations does not mean it is
automatically and permanently discarded; rather that it is subject
to a period of slower development towards more realistic goals.
This process, whereby (what in hindsight proved to be exagger-
ated) expectations were employed to secure support for research
only to be followed by an abrupt collapse, has repeated itself in a
multitude of past technologies; including hydrogen-powered cars
(Bakker, 2010), nanotechnologies (Ebeling, 2008), and genomics
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(Bubela, 2006). No scientific discipline is immune from such
outcomes, and some expectations for the promise of brain imag-
ing and modulation will almost inevitably suffer the same result
to some extent (see e.g., Walsh, 2013). The likelihood of this
occurring is growing as neuroscientists increasingly push the
boundaries of what they are presenting as realistic research out-
comes in their efforts to secure support and resources for their
research. Indeed in Gartner’s (2013) Hype Cycle for Emerging
Technologies, human augmentation (which would include brain
augmentation) is specifically identified as a technology currently
on-the-rise towards its peak of inflated expectations (Gartner,
2013). It has also been suggested that functional neuroimaging
technologies may be even further advanced along the classic
Hype Cycle trajectory than augmentation (Rachul and Zarzeczny,
2012). One example from neuroscience justifying this char-
acterization is the potential use of fMRI in the detection of
deception.
More than a decade on since the first peer-reviewed empir-
ical reports on deception detection in fMRI (see e.g., Spence
et al., 2001; Langleben et al., 2002; Ganis et al., 2003), the
field has seen incremental advances both in the “brain-reading”
technique and in the refinement of cognitive testing protocols
(see e.g., Sartori et al., 2008; Moreno, 2012; Wright et al., 2012;
Park and Friston, 2013). Multiple patent applications have been
filed but the envisioned fMRI deception detector looks still far
from becoming reality. We have highlighted elsewhere a series
of hurdles that an fMRI-based deception detector would need to
surmount before it can succeed (Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen,
2013). These include scientific hurdles such as; the assumptions
and inferences underlying fMRI processes, the need to achieve
consistent internal validity, manipulation of results by subjects,
and the difficulty in moving beyond the laboratory setting. Also
included were legal and ethical hurdles, such as; possible human
rights violations, the issue of compelled questioning, the pro-
bative value of such evidence, and how the right to a fair trial
would be impacted. It is open for debate whether or not its
stimulation counterpart stands a better chance to translate into
an applied deception modulator tool. One obvious advantage
is that certain stimulators are both portable and affordable;
however the science is probably not mature enough to justify
its near-medium term expectations. The reported modulatory
effects (facilitation or interference) obtained in controlled lab-
oratory settings are statistically significant but rather minus-
cule in a standard interrogation context and short-lived, thus
as things stand the gains may not eventually justify the efforts.
This consideration only applies to applicative expectations—
not to the utility and importance of such research within basic
science. The in-lab testing protocols have not been validated
against real-world situations (Luber et al., 2009), and the rela-
tion between modulation of deceits and its effects on other
brain functions are still unclear, as is the role of individual
differences (see Levasseur-Moreau et al., 2013 for a thorough
discussion).
THE DOWNSIDE OF HYPE
The reason why neuroscientists should resist the temptation to
over-hype the potential for brain augmentation is the detrimental
consequences that can follow once unrealistic expectations are
inevitably unmet. These include the following (see Brown, 2003;
Ruef and Markard, 2010):
• Unrealistic short-term hype detracts from the long-term value
of the basic science.
• Financial losses for corporate investors, and future difficulty
in securing resources within fields which have suffered from a
collapse of expectations.
• Resources are diverted from more realistically-achievable, yet
less exciting, research programs.
• Undermined trust, which can slow or prevent future progress
within a field of research.
• The reputations of individuals, companies/institutions, and
entire research fields can suffer as past promises fail to mate-
rialize in the present.
• Identifiable people can suffer as a result; from individuals who
suffer financial loss from investing in unrealistically over-hyped
research programs, to patients who suffer emotionally having
believed the claims that certain proposed brain augmentation
techniques could treat their conditions.
In different combinations, these detrimental consequences
arise in the multitude of science and technology examples pre-
sented in the annual Gartner hype cycles, as well as the specific
case-studies of hydrogen-powered cars, genomics, and nanotech-
nology discussed above.
Nevertheless, despite all these drawbacks of hype the temp-
tation still remains to present the most ambitious expectations
for scientific and technological research as something achiev-
able in the future; be they time-slowing pills to replace prison
sentences, portable reliable lie detectors, brain control devices,
or extra-memory microchips. Perhaps unsurprisingly the prob-
ability of achieving these goals (which may be incredibly small)
and the time-frame for doing so (which may be incredibly
long) are afforded little discussion. The challenge facing neuro-
scientists is how to construct and present expectations that are
less likely to cross that invisible barrier dividing “hope” from
“hype”.
ADDRESSING ETHICAL CONCERNS TO PRODUCE BETTER
EXPECTATIONS AND THE RISKS OF NOT DOING SO
It is our contention that by reflexively considering the ethical,
legal, and social impacts of a potential future technology or
field of advancement, neuroscientists can improve the quality
of the expectations they disseminate within their own field;
thereby developing more nuanced, better expectations. This of
course does not replace or neglects but is additional to the
need for neuroscientists to educate the media, patients and
research subjects about the potential and limits of neuroscience
and neuroscientific techniques; to conduct enough studies and
generate valid scientific data to know what neuroscience and
these techniques can and cannot do. Before we develop this
contention below, two points require expansion and clarification
here. Firstly, we are characterizing these expectations as “better”
if they constitute visions of the future constructed after taking
into account existing legal regimes and concepts of human rights,
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 214 | 4
Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen Expectations, hype and ethics
ethical norms, and attitudes of societies into which they are
expected to operate. Secondly, it should also be emphasized that
the stage we are referring to is the formulation and presenta-
tion of initial expectations by the scientists. This stage often
precedes wider public/multi-stakeholder engagement and the
development of respective communication strategies (for more
detailed discussions of such topics see: Jasanoff, 2003; O’Doherty
and Einsiedel, 2012; Bucchi and Trench, 2014; Stilgoe et al.,
2014).
The concomitant social, legal and ethical implications of a
proposed scientific/technological expectation are often neglected
at the initial stage of its formulation and proposition. Hence
what is often initially presented is the envisioned advancement
free from ostensibly non-scientific constraints; i.e., presenting
the expectations of a pill that slows one’s perception of time or
of the portable lie detector device, but doing so free from any
contextual discussion. This may occur for a number of reasons,
including: (a) because no ethical/legal/social implications exist
(highly unlikely for most expectations); (b) those presenting these
futures have not considered and/or foreseen such implications;
(c) these implications are viewed as either unimportant or not
the responsibility of the scientist involved; and/or (d) there is a
fear that by acknowledging the existence of such implications,
the advancement in question will be viewed less positively thus
putting at risk the benefits expectations can bring to a research
program.
However, failing to reflexively consider the ethical, legal,
and social impacts of a potential future technology or field
of advancement does not negate their existence or make them
disappear. These factors are going to have to be addressed
at some point in the research and development lifecycle of
a new technology for scientific advancements do not develop
or exist separately to the societies in which they operate (see
MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999). We contend that both the
benefits of engaging in this reflexive process early in the devel-
opment of new expectations, as well as the potential negative
implications of failing to do so, make this early consideration
of ethical, legal, and social impacts an essential step in their
development.
By considering ethical, legal, and social impacts to create
“better” expectations, neuroscientists gain a number of
advantages. They can act to avoid their expectations becoming
characterized as hype. They can identify sources of possible
controversy and resistance within their proposed expectations,
thereby affording them the opportunity to consciously address
such issues both through how they formulate their expectations
and how they seek to present them. Also by mitigating the
propensity for individuals or societal groups to actively criticize
or resist their expectations, the neuroscientist is effectively
maximizing their potential network of future supporters.
Failure to create “better” expectations can have specific neg-
ative consequences. It can shift expectations into the realm of
hype (the inherent negative consequences of such were discussed
earlier). It has also been posited that by presenting technological
expectations unfettered by non-technical considerations (such
as ethics, legality, and social acceptability), critics can more
easily create counterarguments by presenting dystopian futures
involving them (see Tutton, 2011). Essentially the argument here
is that; if the presentation of an expectation devoid of some
inherent moral character justifies utopian visions of its future
use, then dystopian visions of its future use are also equally valid
(see Pickersgill, 2011 for a practical example of this argument in
relation to neuro-law).
Furthermore, by promoting a real-world version of, and uses
for, a future technology absent of a robust consideration of
social, legal and ethical issues is to promote a tool that is more
easily open to legitimate social, legal and ethical criticism. We
believe this advice has resonance for many of the expectations
currently being espoused by neuroscientists within the field
of neuroimaging and brain modulation; from enhancing the
cognitive potential of users, to brain control/manipulation, to
increasing/decreasing the capacity of an individual to deceive. An
important point here is that each expectation must be individually
reflexively examined, for the nature of these social, legal and
ethical criticisms will differ depending on the specific appli-
cation that is being envisaged. This diversity means there are
no shortcuts to robust reflexive examinations. For example, in
the case of fMRI deception detection in criminal proceedings
discussed above, we examined in depth how future expectations
of this advancement conflicted with existing legal and human
rights regimes, as well as social and ethical norms. This led us
to conclude that “[c]ognitive neuroscientists must be careful not
to over-play what these technologies can offer criminal courts
nor their vision of the potential future role of neuroscience
within criminal courts, lest they overplay themselves out of the
courtroom altogether” (Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen, 2013, p.
9). Conversely, the main hurdles of brain reading and modu-
lation may be characterized as: legal and human rights issues
over compelled questioning, fair trials, and the probative weight
attached to such evidence; as well as the social implications of
undermining our naturally evolved capacity to deceive. Whereas
those raised by cosmetic enhancement include: the ethicality of
altering fundamental elements of self-identity; social justice con-
cerns over the inequitable distribution of cognitive enhancement
techniques; the undermining of autonomy; and determining the
“proper” role of enhancement technologies in society (Wolpe,
2002; Hamilton et al., 2011). Given the mounting emphasis on
“impact”, even from government founding agencies that have
traditionally encouraged basic research, neuroscientists may need
some assistance in this reflexive process. This could be offered
in the form of further training and multidisciplinary education
opportunities or direct access to professional figures with the
relevant expertise. On the other hand, funding agencies and
scientific journals could also be required to closely monitor
and develop awareness of the more hype-prone research areas,
as their endorsement (sometimes motivated by the immediate
visibility that inflated expectations can grant) may play a role in
amplifying, rewarding and maintaining hype within the scientific
community.
CONCLUSION
Expectations are presented as a valuable tool for neuroscientists
in acquiring both resources and networks of allies to assist in
converting these expectations into reality. However, in applying
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the often-used adage of caution, that “if a little bit of some-
thing is good then a lot is not necessarily better”, unrealis-
tic expectations can become synonymous with hype which in
turn can threaten the very programs the scientists are seeking
to promote. Similarly, promoting the expectation of a scien-
tific or technological advancement free from any social, legal
or ethical considerations will not benefit that advancement.
For any critical assessment will easily be able to identify these
non-technical concerns which neuroscientists have ostensibly
ignored; again placing at risk the programs they are seeking to
advance.
Provided they are supported by (and are not used as a
replacement for) sound research on the safety and efficacy of
neuroscientific techniques, expectations are a valuable resource
for capturing the public’s imagination and promoting investment
in an area for research. We encourage those neuroscientists
working in the field of neuroimaging and brain modulation,
with its exciting prospects for the future, to employ this
valuable resource as they would any other at their disposal
to help further their research goals. We simply caution that
when doing so, if they present expectations that are disasso-
ciated from any measure of realism, or treat the concomi-
tant legal, social and ethical considerations as optional extras,
then hype (and Gartner’s Trough of Disillusionment) surely
awaits.
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